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Saving Their Own Souls
Introduction

In the summer of 2001, as a graduate student in law and theology,
I began work on a master’s thesis that examined the predicament of
men of faith on San Quentin’s Condemned Row. I was working in the
California Appellate Project—mostly assisting with direct appeals and
state habeas petitions on behalf of men under a death sentence—when
a colleague guided me into theological conversations with some of
our clients.1 On Condemned Row, they waited—up to five years to be
assigned a court-appointed appellate attorney, on judges’ rulings, and
to find whether the legal system would ultimately exact the penalty it
had prescribed. Some struggled with guilt or loss, and all endured the
boredom of days spent in solitary cells.
If anyone needed the solace of faith, it was these men. I began the
project, frankly, with a fair amount of skepticism that the men had
become faithful opportunistically. (I recalled once having read about a
prisoner who filed a lawsuit for not being offered a so-called religiouslymandated diet of lobster and champagne, which pretty well summed
up my thoughts on prisoner religious practice.) I was also personally
dissatisfied by supernatural answers to life’s questions and approached
the prisoners’ religious beliefs with a mixture of agnostic temerity and
hyper-educated condescension. But after the year spent corresponding
and meeting with these men and their attorneys or spiritual advisors, I
was impressed by the modesty of their requests and the persistence of
the prison’s denials of their religious requests.
In 2001, nearly every aspect of each man’s religious practice was
subject to (and limited by) the policies of the wardens of San Quentin.
Prisoners were entirely at the mercy of the prison with regard to the diet
prepared, the religious services offered, and the counseling or spiritual
advice available. And frequently, what was offered or forbidden forced
a prisoner to break a requirement of his faith.
Until the passage of the short-lived Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act2 (RFRA) in 1993, prisoners’ legal claims related to their
free exercise of religion were evaluated under a test that required them
both to justify the importance of a particular practice and to prove that
a prison’s concerns about safety and budgeting (or any other concerns a
*Assoc. Professor of Law, Mercer University Walter F. George School of Law. BA, Mercer
University, summa cum laude; MTS, Candler School of Theology; JD, Emory Law School. I would
like to thank Karin Tilly, Michael Umberger, Brooke Walker, Sabrina Atkins, and Ashley Short for
their very able (and amiable) research assistance on this project. I would also like to thank Dean
Gary Simson for offering his guidance and insight.
1
The topics of religion and capital punishment frequently overlap, even outside the context of
religious practice on death row. See Gary J. Simson & Stephen P. Garvey, Knockin’ on Heavens Door:
Rethinking the Role of Religion in Death Penalty Cases, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1090 (2001).
2
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
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Warden might offer) were not justified under the circumstances.3 Such
litigation also put prisoners in the position of defending the sincerity of
their faith and the action which that faith required.
But the 1990s had been an active decade for proponents of free
exercise and offered promise of new legal standards and, perhaps, new
prison policies. The RFRA required the government to provide evidence
of a “compelling interest” in cases of freedom of religion.4 It, however,
was struck down as applied to state law by the United States Supreme
Court in 19975 as overreaching Congressional authority. Only a year
before I began my work in California, a defiant U.S. Congress passed
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act6 (RLUIPA).
That Act was far more generous than the Turner test, but it was too soon
to tell whether the men would ever enjoy RLUIPA’s promised benefits.
First, RLUIPA, like RFRA, seemed vulnerable to an Establishment
Clause challenge and was clearly destined to be the subject of litigation
about its constitutionality.7 Second, men who had litigated under Turner
had become almost accustomed to denials of religious claims and felt
powerless to prompt change. But unexpected challenges lay within a
piece of legislation passed after RFRA and before RLUIPA: the Prison
Litigation Reform Act8 (PLRA). The PLRA was intended to weed out
prisoners’ meritless, successive, or inartfully-crafted civil legal claims,9
but because it was passed after RFRA, it had not been an impediment
to litigation under that statute.
The project changed me and how I thought of prison lawsuits
related to religious practice. I came to understand these lawsuits as
overwhelmingly reasonable, modest, and related to the core of lives
of faith. And so I became particularly interested in whether our courts
offered a means by which to vindicate otherwise-frustrated needs to
act in belief as a follower sees fit.
I fully appreciate that some—perhaps even many—prisoner
religious claims are self-serving, meritless, or abusive. Some suits are
merely the outgrowth of boredom, frustration with prison authority, or
are cynical expressions of a prisoner with far more interest in filing serial
See infra page 128-30 for a more comprehensive description of this test that was established by
the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley.
4
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2)(b) of RFRA states that the government may interfere only if it demonstrates
that the law is “the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.”
5
City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 U.S. 507 (1997).
6
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1 et seq. (2006).
7
Although an Establishment Clause issue was not the basis for the majority of the Supreme
Court’s declaring RFRA unconstitutional, the Establishment issue was noted by Justice Stevens in
his concurrence. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536-37 (Stevens, J., concurring).
8
42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1996).
9
145 Cong. Rec. H5598 (1999) (daily ed. July 15, 1999) (statement of Rep. Nadler noting that “this
bill limits the right of prison inmates to raise otherwise valid claims under the bill by specifically
referencing the Prison Litigation Reform Act”).
3
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lawsuits than to practice a religion of any stripe.10 However, I believe the
law of free exercise (particularly free exercise in prison) employs legal
tests that are sufficient to ferret out the “nonbeliever” or the abusive
litigant. Years later, this article follows on, examining how RLUIPA
has borne up under constitutional scrutiny, and whether it has had its
intended impact upon the men of faith who live in American prisons.
If, for example, the purpose of RLUIPA was to remove encumbrances
upon religious practice in prison, has it succeeded? Or has RLUIPA
been another disappointment, given the deference traditionally given
to prison officials?
The intersection of these two laws is sufficiently beneath most
scholars’ attention that those writing on RLUIPA have had little—if
anything—to say on the matter; this Article is the first to fully examine
the impact of the PLRA upon prisoners’ RLUIPA claims. What I found
after a national survey of lower court cases and reported appellate
opinions, however, was deeply disappointing, if not surprising. For all
the heavy rhetoric and bipartisan support behind RLUIPA’s passage, the
ultimate outcomes of prisoners’ lawsuits related to their free exercise
reveals that it has had only a modest impact. There may or may not exist
the political will to modify either law such that prisoners’ claims have
more likelihood of success, but given the practical and legal restrictions
upon litigation of this sort, the radical change promised in RFRA and
RLUIPA still eludes most prisoners litigating free exercise claims.
I. Perspectives And Context
It was not man who implanted in himself the taste for what is infinite and the
love of what is immortal; these instincts are not the offspring of his capricious
will; their steadfast foundation is fixed in human nature, and they exist in
spite of his efforts.
—de Tocqueville, Democracy in America11
Why does all of this matter? What difference does it make whether
RLUIPA’s new legal test has been effective or has fostered a change for
prisoners? I will begin with a broad inquiry into the fundamental need
of many to belong to a religious group and the importance of religious
practice in the United States. More specifically, this chapter will focus
upon the significance of faith among incarcerated persons generally and
the needs and motivations of prisoners, prison chaplains, and prison
administrators.
Tony Barboza, Inmate Claims Fictitious ‘Festivus’ Religious Holiday to Score Better Food, L.A.
Now, Dec. 14, 2010, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/12/oc-inmate-claims-religiousties-to-festivus-to-score-better-food.html (“An Orange County jail inmate caused a stir this year
by successfully claiming the fictitious holiday Festivus, made famous on the television show
‘Seinfeld,’ as part of his religious beliefs to score better meals.”).
11
Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy In America, Volume 2 (1840).
10
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For the faithful, religion forms identity, nourishes the soul, and
orients the believer within world. According to a relatively recent poll,
“an overwhelming majority (96%) of Americans endorse a belief in God
or a universal spirit.”12 Though religious orientation and belief may vary,
as explained by Karen van der Merwe, “people want to understand
themselves and the world in which they live. This quest for understanding
and meaning is ultimately a spiritual endeavor as it entails searching for
meaning beyond the self, thus transcending the self.”13
For many—and more specifically, in our American context—belief
in a higher authority or power is fundamental to being human.14 Or, as
Douglas Laycock describes, religious beliefs are “important enough to
die for, to suffer for, to rebel for, to emigrate for, to fight to control the
government for.” 15
It is true that our nation values the separation of Church and State,
but, of course that too may be motivated by our collective understanding
of the importance of our freedom to practice (within notable limitations)
as dictated by our conscience. “Within the liberty guaranteed by
the Religion Clauses,” writes Laycock, “the free human beings who
make up the sovereign People may experience a Great Awakening of
Christianity, a mass conversion to Islam or New Age mysticism or any
other faith, or an overwhelming swing to atheism.”16 Not surprisingly,
then, in a 2007 poll conducted by the First Amendment Center, 74%
of respondents stated that “the right to practice the religion of your
choice” is essential and 57% found the “right to practice no religion” to
be essential.17
Just as the people demand the freedom of conscience and room for
plurality, space for religious ritual is important for several reasons. It
connects the believer to her inward soul, her outward community, and
to the God she seeks. Symbolic or not, religious ritual means something:
it transports those who take part to a world of higher and better
things—to clearer insight, to deeper conviction, or stronger connection
to God. Ritual is also a sign of membership in a group, which is of no
small importance. Dietary laws, the Christian sacraments, the pillars of
Heather S. Lonczak et al., Religious Coping and Psychological Functioning in a Correctional
Population, 9 Mental Health, Religion & Culture 171 (2006).
13
Karen van der Merwe, A Psychological Perspective on the Source and Function of Religion, 66
HTS Theological Studies 2010 1, 4 available at http://www/hts.org.za (“Religion provides the
framework or meaning, as the quintessence of meaningfulness is connectedness with God, self
and others.”).
14
See also Gary J. Simson, Endangering Religious Liberty, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 441 (1996).
15
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 313, 317 (1996).
16
Id. at 313.
17
First Amendment Center, State of the First Amendment 2007, 2 (2007), http://www.
firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/SOFA2007results.pdf; see also Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The
Genesis of RLUIPA and Federalism: Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and Its Impact
on Local Government, 40 Urb. Law. 195, 196 (2008) (“The religion clauses of the First Amendment,
which simultaneously forbid the government from establishing religion and from prohibiting its
free exercise, are looked upon with great respect and admiration by many.”).
12
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Islam, ritual grasses, and the like, not only link the pious to the deity
but also link the believer to others who recognize that deity. Robert
Bellah, discussing Durkheim’s notions of ritual and community, writes,
“ [in] ritual interaction the members of the group, through their shared
experience, feel a sense of membership, however fleeting, with a sense
of boundary between those sharing the experience and those outside
it; they feel some sense of moral obligation to each other. . . ”18 That is,
religion, through ritual and belonging, sets up standards of obligation
to members of that community and informs that group’s understanding
of belonging, morality, and roles within the community.
A. The Conflicting Constituencies
One of the problems with accommodating religious practice in
prison is that there are several different interested parties involved,
each with varied motivations and each with legitimate concerns.
First, take the prisoners’ priorities. As populations diversify, so
do religious beliefs.19 At the same time, connectedness to community
(sometimes a new one, sometimes one of importance from a time
before a prisoner’s incarceration) becomes especially important. As
acknowledged by Justice Brennan, dissenting in O’Lone v. Shabazz, “[i]
ncarceration by its nature denies a prisoner participation in the larger
human community. To deny the opportunity to affirm membership
in a spiritual community, however, may extinguish an inmate’s last
source of hope for dignity and redemption.” 20
Religion, as it offers prisoners hope and purpose generally, also
encourages learning and self-improvement. The tale of a prisoner—
formerly lawless, apathetic and angry—undergoing a process of
renewal or rebirth is not a new one. Certainly one of the most wellknown stories of a conversion in prison is the one that Malcolm X tells
in his autobiography. 21 But Malcolm X is not the only person who has
been transformed as a result of religious conversion in prison; many
Robert Bellah, Durkheim and Ritual, in Cambridge Companion to Durkheim, 185-86 (Jeffrey C.
Alexander & Philip Smith, eds. 2005).
19
See also Laycock, supra note 15 at 317 (“… the affirmative goal is to create a regime in which
people of fundamentally different views about religion can live together in a peaceful and selfgoverning society.”); Daniel O. Conkle, Religious Truth, Pluralism, and Secularization: The Shaking
Foundation of American Religious Liberty, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1755, 1767-68 (2011) (“Religion in
America has become radically diverse, and it is likely to become even more so in the decades that
lie ahead. As Professor Stephen J. Stein has explained, the history of American religion has been a
story of ever-increasing religious diversity.”).
20
O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 368 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21
Malcolm X (As told to Alex Haley), The Autobiography of Malcolm X, 153 (1964) (“To
understand that of any person, his whole life, from birth, must be reviewed. . . . I am spending
many hours [in the preparation of this book] because the full story is the best way that I know
to have it seen, and understood, that I had sunk to the very bottom of the American white man’s
society when—soon now, in prison – I found Allah and the religion of Islam and it completely
transformed my life.”).
18
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men become motivated to seek personal enlightenment only after a
criminal conviction.
Belief and faithful commitment may also lead prisoners to help
others—whether in a “faith-sharing” sense or in a more practical
sense. It also offers belonging and acceptance: acceptance often by a
deity, but also from the welcoming embrace of like-minded people in
a similar situation. A primary purpose of religious practice “in prison
is not only to reduce anti-social behavior/criminal behavior or relapse
into criminal activity but also to counteract the tendency of prisons to
dehumanize people and help prisoners prevent a further decline in
their humanity.”22 In a society continually at risk of violence, religion
may “prevent the further deterioration of inmates by helping them to
cope with being a social outcast in a prison situation that is fraught
with loss, deprivation, and survival challenges.” 23
Anyone who has reviewed prisoners’ free exercise lawsuits is
familiar with administrators’ reasons for denying or curtailing certain
practices. Safety, order, and budget are all, of course, valid concerns for
a prison administrator. Prison is a dangerous place in which to work
or live. State and federal budget cuts have real impact upon prison
rehabilitation and security programs. And wardens shoulder a heavy
burden of responsibility not only to their staff and their charges but
to the larger community. Richard Symes, a longtime prison minister,
observes that while prison rules may seem draconian to the outsider,
“almost all rules are made to help implement the prison’s intention to
create a safe place for everyone.” 24
On the other hand, Symes explains, “It is also true that the prison
staff will on occasion ignore, twist, and unfairly administer the rules to
either favor or punish a specific prisoner.” 25 Likewise, the Congressional
record surrounding RLUIPA itself includes an acknowledgment of
inappropriate limitations on prisoners’ religious practice: “It is well
known that prisoners often file frivolous claims; it is less well known
that prison officials sometimes impose frivolous or arbitrary rules.
Whether from indifference, ignorance, bigotry, or lack of resources,
some institutions restrict religious liberty in egregious and unnecessary
ways.”26
Although religious accommodation makes prison administration
more complicated and many prisons are unwilling to offer more than
legally required, a prisoner’s faith does offer some ancillary benefits for
Melvina Sumter, Faith-Based Prison Programs, 5 Crim. & Pub. Pol’y 523, 525 (2006) (citing Todd
R. Clear et al., The Value of Religion in Prison: An Inmate Perspective, 16 J. of Contemp. Crim. Just.
53–74 (2000)).
23
Id.
24
Richard A. Symes, As Though you were in Prison with Them, 53 Presbyterian Criminal Justice
Program, Kentucky 2000.
25
Id.
26
146 Cong. Rec. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy).
22
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prison officials.27As discussed above, prisoners with hope and purpose
are, pragmatically speaking, easier to control. Prisoners have more to
lose and more at stake when connected to a faith group, and many
men, through religious study, learn anew the importance of respect for
authority.28
There are, of course, notable exceptions to this general rule, and
attendant concerns and fears about these deviations may result in
discrimination against minority religious groups. While some groups
advocate harmony and peace, other groups are suspected to advocate
political agitation and overthrow of oppression.29
Against this backdrop of varied interests, priorities, perspectives,
needs, limitations, and guidelines RLUIPA and free exercise claims are
brought, defended against, and decided. No one can reasonably argue
with a prison warden’s desire for order and safety; she has her staff and
inmates’ safety to protect, as well as the public’s general confidence
in the prison system.30 On the other hand, with religious practice and
free exercise as closely-held American values—with attending practical
applications in the prison context—there are powerful countervailing
reasons to question restrictions burdening religious practice.
II. The Undulating Landscape of Free Exercise Tests
A prisoner does not altogether forfeit his or her First Amendment
right to free exercise of religion—even though it may be limited by
incarceration.31 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has so eloquently
Id. In the three years leading up to RLUIPA’s passage, Congress heard testimony and found that
some officials in institutions impose arbitrary restrictions on the religious practices of prisoners.
Many of these restrictions did not further an institution’s policy on discipline, order, or safety. Not
surprisingly then, there is a congressional record supporting action to make it easier for prisoners
to practice their religions and to more easily challenge restrictions upon their exercise. Id.
28
Aaron K. Block, When Money is Tight, is Strict Scrutiny Loose?: Cost Sensitivity as a Compelling
Governmental Interest Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 14 Tex.
J. on C.L. & C.R. 237, 247 (2009). “Cutter declared that courts reviewing RLUIPA claims should
recognize that “context matters” in the application of the Act’s strict scrutiny test. Referencing the
Act’s legislative history, the Court noted that ‘lawmakers supporting RLUIPA were mindful of the
urgency of discipline, order, safety, and security in penal institutions.’”).
29
John W. Popeo, Combating Radical Islam in Prisons within the Legal Dictates of the Free Exercise
Clause, 32 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 135, 140-41 (2006) However, government
officials, even under RLUIPA, still look at ways to regulate religion within prisons. For
example, “based on the fear of Islamic radicals exploiting prisons chaplaincies and institutional
programs provided for inmates, government officials have proposed a number of more stringent
requirements [on Islamic radicals].” Id.
30
See Religious Liberties Act ‘Compromise’ Compromises Local Authority, Nation’s Cities Weekly,
July 24, 2000 (“Oversight of jails and corrections facilities involves weighing public safety, the
security of staff and the safety and individual rights of inmates, as well as many other factors
that affect budgetary and management decisions. This bill would restrict the ability of local
governments to set appropriate corrections policies.”).
31
Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 76, 84 (1987). In Turner v. Safely, the Supreme Court recognized
that “prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the
Constitution.” Id.
27
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articulated, “[t]he right to the free exercise of religion is to be jealously
guarded. It is the right of a human being to respond to what that
person’s conscience says is the dictate of God… A human being does
not cease to be a human being because the human being is a prisoner
of the state.” 32
Although the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,”33 the United States
Supreme Court has long distinguished the freedom to believe from
the freedom to act – or be exempted from reasonable and generallyapplicable laws.34 Protection of religious organizations from the
interference of the state has waxed and waned, undergoing several
incarnations from Sherbert through Smith to RFRA and RLUIPA.
Prisoners’ free exercise claims have never been appellate court darlings,
but the likelihood of success in those cases has risen and fallen as the legal
tests around general free exercise claims have undulated. Long before any
statutes related to court review of free exercise claims (much less prisoner
free exercise claims), the U.S. Supreme Court and lower appellate courts
have struggled with appropriate tests and ranges of acceptable state limits
on Americans’ right to practice as their consciences dictate.
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Prior To
Employment Division v. Smith
Until Employment Division v. Smith,35 the Supreme Court’s early
decisions interpreting Free Exercise claims held that generallyapplicable state and local laws were constitutional as long as the laws
served a rational government purpose. This test operated regardless of
whether the laws inhibited a religious person from practicing a certain
tenet of his faith. 36
In 1963, the Court’s decision in Sherbert v. Verner37 moved in a new
direction: an otherwise neutral law with a discriminatory impact upon
a religious practice would be subject to strict scrutiny.38 If, then, a
Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 876 (1993). In Walsh, an Orthodox Jewish prisoner in a Nevada state
prison brought suit under Section 1983 alleging that by denying him a kosher diet, clothes made
of a single fabric, and access to an Orthodox rabbi; by refusing to allow him to have candles in
his cell; and by disregarding his request to promise to not be transported on the Sabbath prison
officials had violated his First Amendment right to free exercise.
33
U.S. Const. amend. I.
34
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
35
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
36
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1978) (holding that a territory’s law
criminalizing bigamy was constitutional, making the distinction between laws that interfere with
religious practices versus those that interfere with religious belief or opinion); see also Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (explicitly incorporating the Free Exercise Amendment,
but making a distinction between freedom to believe and freedom to act).
37
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
38
Id.
32
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plaintiff could prove a “substantial burden” on his religious practice,
the government was required to demonstrate that the “compelling
governmental interest” motivating the law could not have been satisfied
through less restrictive means.39 Nearly a decade later, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,40 the Court struck down a Wisconsin law requiring public school
attendance of children under the age of sixteen. 41 Finding that the
children of the Amish plaintiffs were adequately educated within their
own community, it held that the law unreasonably burdened the free
exercise rights of those challenging the law.42
By the 1980’s, however, after the Sherbert/Yoder decisions, the
Supreme Court purported to apply strict scrutiny analysis when
reviewing facially-neutral decisions but failed to apply the test as
rigidly as it had in those earlier opinions. For example, in Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,43 the Supreme Court
rejected a challenge to a forest service road that ran directly through a
sacred Native American site.44 The Court reasoned that the road only
“incidentally” burdened the exercise of religion and did not “coerce”
anyone to violate religious beliefs.45 Further, in United States v. Lee,46
the Court refused to hold social security and unemployment insurance
taxes unconstitutional as applied to Amish employers because, even
though the taxes did burden Amish beliefs, the government had a
compelling interest in preserving the social security system.47
B. Prisoners’ Free Exercise Cases And Precedent
At the same time as the high Court was narrowing and revising its
tests related to generally-applicable laws concerning free exercise, it
began to look at prisoners’ cases. In the late 1980s, the Turner v. Safley
test became the applicable standard governing prisoners’ claims under
section 1983—including free exercise claims. Under that analysis, the
State was simply required to show that its action was “reasonably
related” to a “legitimate penological interest.”48 Turner was an attempt
to “balance” the protection of prisoners’ constitutional rights with
Id.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
485 U.S. 439 (1988).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
455 U.S. 252 (1982).
47
Id.
48
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; see also Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and
Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 501, 507-08 (2005)
(“The renaissance of prisoner free exercise claims ended with the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision
in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz. Citing its earlier precedent of Turner v. Safley, which narrowly
construed the due process rights of prisoners, the Court rejected both strict and heightened
scrutiny for prisoner free exercise claims.”).
39
40
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legitimate correctional priorities by considering a number of factors,
such as the extent to which alternate avenues for religious practice
remained open to inmates and the impact that accommodation would
have on prison operations.49 Not surprisingly, very few prisoners’
lawsuits prevailed under the Turner analysis.
As the four Turner dissenters—Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun—presciently identified, “[t]he Court’s rather open-ended
‘reasonableness’ standard makes it much too easy to uphold restrictions
on prisoners’ First Amendment rights on the basis of administrative
concerns and speculation about possible security risks rather than
on the basis of evidence that the restrictions are needed to further an
important governmental interest.”50
For example, O’Lone, decided one week after Turner and using the
test prescribed therein, confirmed that prisons are, with some guidelines,
allowed to limit fundamental rights by alleging that they have a reasonable
justification for doing so. 51 From the beginning of its opinion in O’Lone,
the Court recognized it had recently determined a “proper standard” to
apply when an inmate is challenging a prison regulation and asserting it
restricts inmates’ constitutional rights.52 It reiterated the notion that the
Turner approach ‘“ensures the ability of corrections officials ‘to anticipate
security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems of prison administration.’”53
The lower court in O’Lone had required prison officials to show that
no reasonable policy would allow the prisoners to attend Jumu’ah54
without creating security concerns. The Supreme Court, however,
declined to adopt that test; instead, it looked generally to whether the
prisoners had alternative means to observe their faith—without regard
to any particular religious practice.55 After determining that prisoners
could participate in other Muslim practices, such as observing
Ramadan56 and dietary requirements, the Court decided that there
Id. The complete list of Turner factors require that courts consider (1) whether there existed
a “valid, rational connection” between the prison regulation and the legitimate (and neutral)
governmental interest justifying it; (2) whether alternative means of exercising the right remained
open to prison inmates; (3) the sort of impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right
might have on guards and other prisoners, and on the allocation of prison resources generally;
and (4) whether there exists a reasonable alternative to the prison regulation. Id.
50
Turner, 482 U.S. at 101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51
O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). In O’Lone, the prisoners were of Islamic faith and
contended that two prison regulations prevented them attending a Muslim service that was
offered on Friday afternoons. Id. at 344-45.
52
Id. at 349 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
53
Id.
54
Id. at 344. Jumu’ah, meaning “Friday prayer,” is a congregational prayer held by Muslims every
Friday, just after noon.
55
Id. at 350-52.
56
Id. at 352. Ramadan is the Islamic month of fasting, in which participating Muslims refrain
from eating, drinking, smoking and sex during daylight hours. It is intended to teach Muslims
about patience, spirituality, humility and submissiveness to Allah.
49
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was no obligation that the prison accommodate their desire to attend
Jumu’ah.57
Cases decided under the Turner/O’Lone tests rarely moved beyond
the Summary Judgment stage –frequently because of prisons’ defense on
the basis of safety or budgetary concerns. Under those four factors, courts
did not focus upon legitimacy of a prisoner’s religion or the strength of
his or her faith and more on the prison policy or action itself.58
C. Employment Division v. Smith And
Legislative Responses Thereto
The 1990s saw a power struggle between the Court’s evolving
standards related to free exercise and Congressional interest in
protecting religious freedom. In Employment Division v. Smith, the
Supreme Court departed from its earlier precedent in Yoder and
Sherbert.59 Justice Scalia wrote for a 5-4 majority and announced that
criminalizing peyote use only incidentally burdened two members of
a Native Americans’ religious beliefs.60 The Court reasoned that there
was no need to apply strict scrutiny analysis because the standard is
too stringent for general, neutral laws that are not overtly intended
to restrict religious beliefs.61 This changed the landscape somewhat –
and many were dismayed. Professor Douglas Laycock spoke for many
when he complained, “This Court has said to Americans of all faiths
that they have a constitutional right to believe their religion but no
constitutional right to practice it.”62
The Court distinguished Sherbert and Yoder analysis, limiting
Sherbert to its factual context as an unemployment benefits case
involving a system of individualized exemptions.63 It further reasoned
that Yoder was a “hybrid” case because it affected more than one
fundamental right (free exercise of religion and the right for parents
to direct education of their children). No particular standard of review
Id. “By placing the burden on prison officials to disprove the availability of alternatives,” the
Court explained, “the approach articulated by the Court of Appeals fails to reflect the respect and
deference that the United States Constitution allows for the judgment of prison administrators.”
Id. Even further, the Court found that a gathering for Jumu’ah among prisoners could threaten
prison security and anger other inmates, who would not get to participate in the gathering. Id. at
352.
58
For example, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “there is no question that respondent’s
sincerely held religious beliefs which compelled attendance at Jumu’ah.” Id. at 345.
59
494 U.S. 872.
60
Id. Smith and Black were fired from their jobs for using peyote, a sacrament in the Native
American church in which they were members. Id. at 872. They were subsequently denied
unemployment benefits by the state of Oregon because they had been dismissed for work-related
misconduct. Id. The State’s position was that the dismissals were based on criminal drug statutes
and that the statutes were neutral and generally applicable. Id.
61
Id. at 881-82.
62
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty, Volume 2: The Free Exercise Clause 58 (2011).
63
Smith, 494 U.S. 872. Here, there was misconduct and plaintiffs were not subject to individualized
exceptions because they violated Oregon’s controlled substance laws. Id.
57

Legislation & Policy Brief

131

was discussed, but it was clear that scrutiny less than strict scrutiny
was applied to general, neutrally-applicable laws.64 However, laws not
generally-applicable or neutral remained subject to the Sherbert/Yoder
strict scrutiny analysis if it substantially burdened a religion practice.65
D. Free Exercise Power Struggles: Smith, RFRA and RLUIPA
In response to constituents’ outcries, Congress legislatively
overturned the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v.
Smith through enactment of RFRA.66 The purpose behind RFRA was
to return to the pre-Smith analysis of free exercise claims—including,
presumably (though not explicitly) claims brought by prisoners. More
specifically, Congress intended to restore the Sherbert/Yoder test by
subjecting all laws that “substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion” to strict scrutiny, even if the state or local laws were generally
applicable and neutral.67 In order for the State to survive a free exercise
challenge brought by a prisoner under RFRA and its more stringent test,
it had to show not only a compelling interest justifying its substantial
burden upon free exercise but also that it had employed the “least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.”68 Senator
Oren Hatch—a co-sponsor of the legislation—described RFRA as one
of the most significant pieces of legislation to ever come before the
Congress.”69
RFRA was controversial, especially as related to prisoners’ religious
practices. Some argued that it created another series of rights to hardened
criminals or would flood the court system with frivolous claims. There
are pages of discussion in the corresponding Congressional Record
in the Senate regarding the harms RFRA could do to prisons, court
systems, prisoners, and prison wardens.70 However, some legislators
clearly thought RFRA could repair the damage the Smith decision had
exacted upon on religious free exercise.71
The Supreme Court quickly responded to RFRA in Boerne v. Flores,72
and the power struggle continued.73 It declared RFRA unconstitutional,
because—although section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave
Congress the power to enforce certain rights—it did not give Congress
Id. at 881-82.
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993)
(applying strict scrutiny analysis to a non-neutral law that substantially burdened Santerian’s
religious exercise of sacrificing animals).
66
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S. §2000bb (1993).
67
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2000bb-4.
68
See supra note 13 at 443.
69
139 Cong. Rec. S 2610 (1993).
70
139 Cong. Rec. 26181-90 (1993). For further discussion of the Congressional Record surrounding
RFRA, see infra Part VI.
71
139 Cong. Rec. 4922 (daily ed. March 11, 1993) (statements of Sen. Kennedy).
72
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
73
Gaubatz, supra note 48 at 509.
64
65
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the power to change the substance of what those rights entailed or
to create new rights.74 Thereafter, RFRA still applied to federal laws,
but state or local laws were again subject to the Smith analysis.75 For
prisoners, the effect of the Boerne decision was to restore the less
restrictive reasonableness standard articulated in Turner and followed
in O’Lone.76
E. The Religious Land Use And Institutionalized Persons Act
Undaunted, Congress initiated RLUIPA legislation less than a month
after the Court’s decision in Boerne v. Flores. 77 Immediately following
the decision, legislators held a first series of meetings to consider what
alternative sources of legislation were available to Congress in order
to protect against religious discrimination and substantial burdens on
religious practice.78 One representative noted, “Because the freedom
to practice one’s religion is a fundamental right, we are meeting this
morning . . . to consider what sources of authority Congress may utilize
to protect this most precious freedom from government infringement.”
79
At some point, the discussion turned to burdens upon religious free
exercise in land use regulations and denial of religious exercise in staterun institutions.80
Though prisoners’ free exercise claims met with little success in the
federal courts even as late as 2001, RLUIPA’s passage at the turn of the
century offered promise and hope. Like its predecessor, it “restored”
a compelling interest test for laws impacting religious practices and
discarded the previous rational basis test. 81 Enacted under congressional
Spending Clause powers—rather than the powers invoked for RFRA
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment82—the relevant portion
of RLUIPA reads,
No government shall impose a substantial burden on
the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined
to an institution. . . even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
Id. at 530, 532.
See id.
76
Bolin v. Rice, 2000 WL 342676 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
77
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc to -5 (2006).
78
See Protecting Religious Freedom after Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Rep. Canady).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
42 U.S.C. § 2000-cc (2001).
82
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, under which many
prisoners’ free exercise claims were brought, was found an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’
powers, and does not apply to the States. Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
74
75
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interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.83
RLUIPA applies to any “program or activity that receives Federal
financial assistance” or when “the substantial burden affects, or removal
of that burden would affect [] commerce . . . among the several states.”
84
Thus, RLUIPA applies to prisoners because prisons receive federal
funding. And at least theoretically, the language of that test offered
hope for success to prisoners filing religious practice claims. Under
RLUIPA, if a prisoner is able to demonstrate that a substantial burden
has been imposed on his or her religious practice, the burden of proof
then shifts to the State to demonstrate both the existence of a compelling
governmental interest and that the method complained of is the “least
restrictive means of furthering” that compelling interest.85 The test
is markedly more favorable to the prisoner than the Turner v. Safley
test, under which the prisoner carried the factual burden and through
which a prison might prevail by showing merely that its policies were
“‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological interests.”86
F. RLUIPA’s Constitutionality
The question of RLUIPA’s constitutionality was always present
because of the fate of its predecessor.87 In its clearest statement about
religious practice in prison since its decision in Turner v. Safley, the
United States Supreme Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson88 not only found
RLUIPA to be constitutional but also offered guidance related to its
application to prisoners’ free exercise cases.89 First, the Court “found
RLUIPA’s institutionalized-persons provision compatible with the
Establishment Clause because it alleviate[d] exceptional governmentcreated burdens on private religious exercise.”90 RLUIPA, it continued,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(b)(1)- (2) (2006).
Id.
85
Id.
86
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1987).
87
The amicus curiae briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson supporting
RLUIPA’s constitutionality and the prisoners’ rights to conform to their religious beliefs
demonstrate the diversity of RLUIPA’s support. Individuals and organizations filing amicus
curiae briefs included: the Rutherford Institute, the Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion,
Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Edward M. Kennedy, the American Correctional Chaplains
Association, Former state corrections officials, state prisoners, prison fellowship, the Jewish
Prisoner Services International, the American Catholic Correctional Chaplains Association, the
Prison Dharma Network, the Nation Association of Evangelicals, the Union of Orthodox Jewish
Congregation, the states of New York and Washington, and others. Cutter, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
88
544 U.S. 709 (2005).
89
James D. Nelson, Incarceration, Accommodation, and Strict Scrutiny, 95 Va. L. Rev. 2053, 2059-60
(2009) (“The Cutter Court affirmed the constitutionality of RLUIPA, holding that the heightened
standard of review did not impermissibly favor religion.”).
90
Cutter, 544 U.S. 709, 720.
83
84
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“thus protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to
attend to their religious needs” and who are also “therefore dependent
on the government’s permission and accommodation for exercise
of their religion.”91 Cutter also reaffirmed that the state must not, in
its accommodation, confer any “privileged status on any particular
religious sect” nor should the state “single[] out [any] bona fide faith
for disadvantageous treatment.”92 And while courts may not enter into
an inquiry regarding the sincerity of a prisoner’s beliefs or whether “the
belief or practice in question is ‘compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief,’93 RLUIPA does permit inquiry regarding ‘whether the
objector’s beliefs are ‘truly held.’”94
Whether advocating or criticizing, scholars noted that RLUIPA has
increased prisoner litigants’ opportunities to challenge administrative
policies that hinder religious practices. Some feared that the RLUIPA
would result in a flood of prisoner litigants’ claims, predicting that “the
Supreme Court’s decision in Cutter will most likely result in an increase
in litigation and thereby burden penological interests.”95
What is generally agreed upon, however, is that RLUIPA was
an unprecedented legal statement in support of religious practice in
prison. Never before—whether under a legislative effort or court
opinion—had prisoners enjoyed such public statements in support
of their free exercise. After Cutter was decided, Brian Fahling, senior
trial attorney for the American Family Association Center for Law and
Policy, quipped ruefully: “It is a sign of the times, I suppose, that it took
a witch and a Satanist to secure the rights of inmates to worship.”96
But whether Protestant or wiccan, RLUIPA was supposed to stand for
the proposition that all prisoners of faith should be able to practice
according to the dictates of their conscience and would have recourse
to the federal courts if that was impeded by their custodians.
III. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
In the years that intervened the passage of RFRA and RLUIPA,
Congress passed another federal law related to civil lawsuits—whether
or not related to religious practice. Though it has received almost no
attention in the examination of the success and impact of RLUIPA, this
little law has had a tremendous influence on whether RLUIPA has
Id. at 721.
Id. at 724.
93
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725, n.13 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(a)); see also Navajo Nation v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2007).
94
Ibid. (internal citations omitted).
95
Morgan F. Johnson, Heaven Help Us: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act’s
Prisoners Provisions in the Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 14 Am.
U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 585, 599 (2006).
96
B.A. Robinson, Religious Freedom Restoration Acts Additional Attempts at Federal Legislation: RLPA
and RLUIPA, http://www.religioustolerance.org/rfra3.htm (accessed July 19, 2011).
91
92
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proven an effective tool for prisoners litigating about religious free
exercise. The PLRA was signed into law in April of 1996 as a rider
within an omnibus appropriations bill97 after Congress was unable
to pass eight out of thirteen annual federal appropriations bills
(which led to a brief government shutdown during November and
December of 1995 and January of 1996).98 Whatever the cause of the
bill’s quick movement into law99, there were at least some lawmakers
who were unhappy with the inclusion of the PLRA rider with such
sparse debate.100 While criticism of appropriations riders in general
is beyond the scope of this article, two real problems have emerged
from the passage of the PLRA: (1) a vast decrease in a prisoner’s ability
to litigate even claims with merit and (2) an increase in litigation over
the statutory construction of the PLRA.101
A. PLRA And Constitutionality102
The PLRA, which applies to all prisoners’ federal civil rights cases
(even RLUIPA and other religious free exercise claims), was enacted
to better screen prisoner claims and therefore includes a number of
strict litigation requirements. Its general constitutionality has never
been considered by the Supreme Court.103 Instead, the Court has
analyzed cases involving small aspects of the Act and either refined the
challenged rule or expanded it. 104
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Bill of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321-66 (1996).
98
Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Alter of Appropriations Riders: A
Constitutional Crisis, 21 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 457, 507-09 (1997).
99
Giovanna Shay and Johanna Kalb, More Stories of Jurisdiction-Stripping and Executive Power:
Interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 291, 300 (2007) (“Passed
hastily and with scant legislative history, the PLRA represented a moment when state attorneys
general were able to take advantage of anti-prisoner and anti-activist court sentiment--as well as
a Republican-controlled Congress--to curtail access to courts.”).
100
142 Cong. Rec. S2296 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy that “[a]lthough a version of the
PLRA was introduced as a free-standing bill and referred to the Judiciary Committee, it was never
the subject of a committee mark-up, and there is no Judiciary Committee report explaining the
proposal. The PLRA was the subject of a single in the Judiciary Committee, hardly the type of
thorough review that a measure of this scope deserves.”).
101
See generally, Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Enigmatic Exhaustion
Requirement: What it means and what Congress, the Courts and Correctional Officials Can Learn from it,
86 Corn. L. Rev. 483 (2001).
102
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997.
103
“The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in only a few of the many cases in
which federal courts have interpreted the provisions of the PLRA, and in several of these the
Court discussed general principles of the Act such as the purpose of the Act (§ 4), its movement
away from a discretionary standard (§ 5), its limitations on injunctive relief (§ 6), and whether
some provisions of the Act would be applied retroactively (§ 7).” Philip White, Jr., Construction and
Application of Prison Litigations Reform Act – Supreme Court Cases, 51 A.L.R. Fed.2d 143 (originally
published in 2010).
104
This can be seen in Woodford v. NGO, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) and Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
In these cases, the prisoner-petitioners challenged the exhaustion requirement of PLRA.
97
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The Act’s “exhaustion” requirement is perhaps the prisoners’
most difficult hurdle and is the topic of the most litigation. The PLRA
provides that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility
until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”105
The law’s mandatory exhaustion provision replaced the weaker
requirement in the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Person Act, which
left discretion with the district courts to determine whether the prisoner
had exhausted the administrative remedies.106 The changes within
the PLRA, however, restricts courts’ discretion to find that a prisoner
has brought all necessary administrative challenges.107 In addition to
deterring even meritorious prisoner lawsuits, the PLRA has generated
its own vast litigation about when exhaustion requirements apply and
what they demand of prisoners.108
A decade after the PLRA’s enactment, in Woodford v. NGO, the United
State Supreme Court settled a growing circuit split over the meaning
of the term “exhaustion.”109 Although the text of the statute does not
explicitly call for it, Woodford interpreted the PLRA’s administrative
exhaustion requirement as requiring “proper” exhaustion.110 In the
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a). Exhaustion of administrative remedies, pursuant to Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), is required for all prisoner suits seeking redress for prison circumstances
or occurrences, regardless of whether they involve general circumstances of incarceration or
particular episodes. Porter v. Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983 (2002).
106
Woodford v. NGO, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006).
107
Not surprisingly, this requirement has made quite an impact upon civil litigation around
prison conditions. See e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that prisoner
must exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court); McKinney v. Carey, 311
F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of inmate’s complaint who was in the process
of exhausting his administrative remedies); Medina-Claudio v. Rodriguez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 36
(1st Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal when inmate failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
in place); Jackson v. Dist. of Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal
of inmates’ complaint because they had begun, but not yet exhausted, the prison grievance
procedure); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999) (dismissing inmate’s complaint
brought under RFRA because he filed his federal complaint before allowing the administrative
process to be completed); Perez v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir.
1999) (remanding for dismissal and reversing the district court’s refusal to dismiss when, at the
time the district court was ruling on the motion to dismiss, the inmate had fully exhausted his
administrative remedies but had not done so at the time of filing).
108
Id.
109
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 87. In Woodford, the prisoner had filed a grievance with the prison
officials. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation rejected the grievance as
being untimely filed since the prisoner filed the complaint six months after the restriction had
initially been imposed upon the plaintiff, exceeding California’s 15-working day rule. After an
unsuccessful appeal to the California Department of Corrections, the prisoner filed suit against
prison officials. The Ninth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit had interpreted a prisoner to have satisfied
the PLRA’s ‘exhaustion’ requirement once all administrative remedies were no longer available.
Id.
110
Id. at 87. According to the Woodford Majority, the text of the PLRA “strongly suggests” the
term “exhausted” requires ‘proper’ exhaustion. But the dissent cautions that the Majority’s
interpretation “essentially ignores the PLRA’s text.”
105
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wake of that decision, it is not enough that the prisoner has confronted
prison administrators with his complaint; rather, he must have followed
the proper procedure in filing grievances and alleging interference with
religious practice.111 According to one commentator, “the [Woodford]
decision effectively leaves the ability to define the hurdles a prisoner
must clear (in the form of prison grievance procedures) in the hands
of prison officials, making them gate-keepers to both federal and, in
some jurisdictions, state courts.”112 These gate keepers may review
technical issues or whether a prisoner used the correct form or named
the proper official.
Prior to 2001, the federal circuit courts were also divided on the
question of whether a prisoner who was seeking only monetary
damages which could not be obtained through a prison’s grievance
process must still exhaust all “available” remedies. This Circuit split
was resolved by Booth v. Churner, in which the Supreme Court held that
a prisoner who is only seeking monetary damages must still exhaust
all prison remedies as long as the prison’s grievance committee has
the authority to take some remedial action. 113 Thus, this issue was
essentially decided in favor of the prisons, a fact that has militated
against prisoner claims regardless of their merit.114
Also controversial is the “physical harm” requirement, particularly
in the context of First Amendment and RLUIPA claims. 115 As with
many other civil claims, the injury involved in the denial of the right to
free exercise of religion is usually not physical; rather, it is emotional or
spiritual. Applied strictly, this restriction would prevent most prisoners
from asserting that they have been denied reasonable opportunities to
practice their religious beliefs.116 Immediately after PLRA’s passage, it
was used as a defense to a New York prisoner’s free exercise claim.117
Circuits are split on the issue of physical harm and how to interpret
it. Some courts have held that it does not apply to some claims. For
example, in Saheed-Muhammad v. Dipaelo, that district court explained
that “regardless of actual physical or emotional injury,” if the prisoner’s
constitutional claim involves “the violation of intangible rights,” the
For one example, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) has an
administrative grievance system for prisoner complaints. Regs., tit.15 SECTION 3084.1 (2007).
Before filing suit prisoners must submit a CDC Form 602. There are four separate levels of appeals
the first of which must be initiated within fifteen working days of the event being appealed.
California prisoners must follow this process—including the filing of the initial grievance and
timely appeals to each of the four levels of appeals—in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement
of § 1997e(a).
112
Shay and Kalb, supra note 99 at 293.
113
532 U.S. 731 (2001).
114
Id.
115
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
116
See Stacy Heather O’Brien, Closing the Courthouse Door: The Impact of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act’s Physical Injury Requirement on the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1189 (1997).
117
Harris v. Lord, 957 F. Supp. 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (at issue here, however, was a question of
retroactivity and the prisoner’s suit was allowed to continue).
111
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physical harm subsection simply does “not govern.” 118 The Ninth, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits and a number of other district courts have likewise
made distinctions between constitutional— particularly First Amendment—
claims and other civil claims made by prisoners.119 This subsection has never
been considered by the Supreme Court, however, and remains a puzzle
largely left to lower courts to interpret, accept, or reject entirely.
Beyond the PLRA’s general constitutionality and aside from
questions of exhaustion or application, other provisions of the PLRA
raise constitutional concerns. For example, one federal district court has
held that the “three strikes” provision (28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(g)) violates
the Equal Protection Clause.120 The requirements related to filing fees,
however, consistently withstand constitutional challenges.121
Still, all of these technical factors have a significant impact upon
whether a prisoner receives a hearing on the merits, and while some
have praised the PLRA, others condemn its restrictions. Professor
Schlanger, who analyzed federal court filings for her scholarship on
inmate litigation, explains, “The statute has been highly successful in
reducing litigation, triggering a forty-three percent decline over five
years, notwithstanding the simultaneous twenty-three percent increase
in the incarcerated population.” 122 The question of whether this
effectiveness is appropriate and its unintended impact upon RLUIPA
litigation is at the heart of the inquiry here.
IV. How Have RLUIPA Claims Really Fared In The Courts
(And Has PLRA Made An Impact)?
RLUIPA brought with it a good deal of discussion—hype, even—
and raised the hopes of a number of religious practice advocates and
prisoners themselves. Scholars, both supporters and detractors, have
discussed various reasons why RLUIPA has been a useful new tool for
some prisoner litigants.
Saheed-Muhammad v. Dipaelo, 138 F.Supp. 2d 99, 107 (2001) (citing Memphis Community
School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n. 11 (1986)) (stating that courts should vindicate
deprivations of certain “absolute” rights that are not shown to have caused actual injury because
of their fundamental importance in organized society).
119
Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir.1998) (“[t]he deprivation of First Amendment
rights entitles a plaintiff judicial relief wholly aside from any physical injury he can show, or
any mental or emotional injury he may have incurred.”); see also Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778,
781 (7th Cir.1999) (deprivation of First Amendment rights is a cognizable injury unencumbered
by requirements of physical, mental or emotional injury); Williams v. Ollis, 230 F.3d 1361 (6th
Cir. 2000) (the PLRA does not cover First Amendment retaliation claim); Mason v. Schriro, 45
F.Supp.2d 709, 720 (W.D.Mo.1999) (Equal Protection Claims under the Fourteenth Amendment
could be brought without allegation of physical harm); Warburton v. Underwood, 2 F.Supp.2d
306, 315 (W.D.N.Y.1998) (declined to dismiss the plaintiff’s Establishment Clause claim for want
of proof of physical injury because “such claims nevertheless deserve to be heard”).
120
Ayers v. Norris, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
121
Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1997); Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227 (4th Cir.
1997); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1997 F. App. 0059P (6th Cir. 1997).
122
Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1555, 1694 (2003).
118
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Now, ten years after RLUIPA’s passage and with the benefit of time
to examine district and circuit cases addressing prisoner lawsuits, the
result is disappointing. Though, to be fair, RLUIPA has allowed some
significant victories, under this—the most accommodating test under
which prisoner free exercises have ever been considered—the overall
range of outcomes is less than remarkable.
A. A Number Of RLUIPA Cases Have Won On The Merits Or
Survived Summary Judgment
Over the past decade, a number of RLUIPA cases have been
successful on the merits with resulting relief for prisoners. Despite the
disappointments noted and described further in this Article, it would be
disingenuous not to recognize these cases in which prisoners’ lawsuits
prevailed because the plaintiffs had been prohibited from worshiping
as their consciences dictate.
For one example, the Ninth Circuit’s has acknowledged that prisons may
still curtail prisoners’ religious freedoms in some instances, but cautioned
that “in light of RLUIPA, no longer can prison officials justify restrictions on
religious exercise by simply citing to the need to maintain order and security
in a prison.” 123 Undoubtedly, this represents a leap in jurisprudence on
prisoners’ religious practice claims from Turner and O’Lone.
Some categories of cases have been consistently successful, with
others yielding mixed results. RLUIPA free exercise claims have been
most successful when a prisoner’s claim has had no reasonable security
impact, a minimal financial burden upon the prison administration,
and has involved a core tenet of a prisoner’s religious beliefs.
For example, possession of religious articles and books have
frequently been the subject of religious practice lawsuits —under
the First Amendment Turner test, RFRA, and under RLUIPA. These
have no perceptible financial impact (since these cases deal with
possession—not provision—of religious articles) and a limited realistic
security interest. Under RLUIPA, some federal circuits have granted
relief, though they failed under other tests. For instance, the victory of
a Muslim inmate who sued prison officials for prohibiting him from
possessing prayer oil won relief at both the district and circuit levels
was unprecedented at the time.124
Hair and beard length have been other new areas of success for
Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 985 (2008) (where the Ninth circuit found
that a prison policy outright banning a particular religious practice—regardless of available
alternatives—constitutes a “substantial [ ] burden” on one’s free exercise).
124
Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003) (denying relief, however, on an additional
claim related to the prison’s rules restricting the number of religious feasts an inmate may observe
per year); cf. Borzych v. Frank, 439 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that prison’s ban on white
supremacist books did not violate RLUIPA).
123

140

Saving Their Own Souls

many of the same reasons,125 though somewhat surprisingly not in all
federal circuits.126 It is clear that a few successes would not have been
possible if not for RLUIPA’s new legal test. For example, California
prisoners who brought a claim about the right to wear beards won
relief in the Ninth Circuit. That court was receptive to the prisoners’
arguments, determining that the prison had no compelling interest in
regulating religiously-mandated beards. 127
Similarly, addressing the issue of the Jumu’ah services, the court
noted that while the prison’s interest in having a workforce of prisoners
and a system that encourages participation in that work detail was a
compelling interest, the policy of punishing Muslim prisoners who
missed one hour of work detail a week to attend Jumu’ah services was
not the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.128 The simple
alternative of simply creating an exemption for Muslims that missed work
detail while attending Jumu’ah services was clearly more appropriate .129
Lawsuits related to religiously-mandated diets are perennial ones
presenting a difficult balancing of interests: of course diet is fundamental
to the belief of many prisoners, but while it poses no threat to security,
providing alternative meals can be expensive. For this reason, many
of these cases have not been successful in the federal courts no matter
the legal test—Turner, RFRA, or RLUIPA—under which the issue is
considered. One very recent Circuit court case, though, proved successful
for a Muslim inmate who alleged a violation of RLUIPA for failure to
provide a halal diet. 130 Likewise, once a prison provides a religious diet
to prisoners, they may not be denied that accommodation without
reasonable justification. When, for instance, a prisoner was removed from
the prison’s list of Ramadan participants after a guard filed a report that
he had broken the fast, his RLUIPA claim against the prison won relief.131
Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting Native American inmate granted
relief in the Ninth Circuit over the prison’s grooming and hair length policies because of the substantial
burden on his religious practice and limited financial and security impact inmates’ long hair).
126
Thunderhorse v. Pierce, 364 F. App’x 141 (5th Cir. 2010) (reasoning that the hair length policy
substantially burdened plaintiff’s religious exercise but was the lease restrictive means of a
compelling governmental interest in prison security).
127
Mayweathers v. Terhune, 328 F. Supp. 2d. 1086, 1088 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (reasoning that a halfinch beard made a prisoner no more difficult to identify, and therefore the risk of a bearded
prisoner being able to escape unnoticed was exaggerated and the regulation was an overreaction).
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010) (“DOC” substantially burdened the
inmates religious exercise by refusing to offer the prisoner a halal diet); see also Willis v. Comm‘r,
Indiana Dept. of Corr., 2010 WL 4457432 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 1, 2010) (stating that denial of kosher
diets substantially burdened inmate’s religious exercise and increased costs of providing kosher
meals to inmates is not a “compelling interest”).
131
Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174,188 (4th Cir. 2006) (“An inmate…could decide not to be religious
about fasting and still be religious about other practices, such as congregational services or group
prayer. Such an inmate’s right to religious exercise is substantially burdened by a policy, like the
one here, that automatically assumes that lack of sincerity with respect to one practice means lack
of sincerity with respect to others.”).
125
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Not all prisoners’ RLIUPA claims have been caught in the net
of summary judgment. But this does not necessarily foreshadow
ultimate success; many of those cases surviving summary judgment
do so because of incomplete or insufficient factual records precluding
summary judgment for either party.132 A number of prisoners’ cases
have moved forward because of their ability to exhaust administrative
remedies.133 Still, in more factually complex circumstances there is
perhaps an indication that the courts are exhibiting a diminishing
deference to prison officials’ judgment.134
B. Despite RLUIPA’s Promise, Prisoners Remain Disappointed
While the passage of RLUIPA foreshadowed an increase in
successful prisoners’ claims, a consistent trend of that sort has yet to
emerge in the courts. The success described above notwithstanding,
RLUIPA has not been the “magic bullet” of free exercise in prison. In
“RLUIPA at Four,” an early article (and arguably the most important)
on the topic, the author described that at the time of publication only
seven out of forty RLUIPA cases had been dismissed. 135 And in a piece
critical of RLUIPA’s application to prisoners, the author asserts that
“an assessment of actual RLUIPA actions reveals that the majority of
prisoners’ claims are successful, even when important penological
interest are at stake.”136 Both claims are drastically overstated and
oversimplified. Instead of considering the outcomes not favorable to a
prisoners’ claim—such as a loss at summary judgment—both speedily
leaps to the conclusion that all thirty three cases involving RLUIPA and
prisoners were granted relief of some sort. This was not the case then
and is not the case to date.
Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the grant of summary judgment for the
defendants was improper because the District Court did not consider whether the institution’s
practices in restricting the inmates’ diets and group worship satisfied the least restrictive means
standard); Sample v. Lappin, 424 F.Supp.2d 187 (D.D.C. 2006) (refusing to grant summary
judgment, as genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the outright ban on Sample’s
consumption of wine was the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s compelling
interest in controlling intoxicants).
133
Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2009) (showing that a prisoner who fully exhausted his
administrative remedies and did not encounter problems under the PLRA, having the defendants’
motion for summary judgment vacated on the RLUIPA claim); Orafan v. Goord, 411 F.Supp.2d
153 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that although the defendants, in seeking summary judgment, alleged
that the plaintiffs had not properly exhausted their administrative remedies, the district court
found that these remedies were properly exhausted, allowing the court to reach the plaintiffs’
RLUIPA claims); Pugh v. Goord, 571 F.Supp.2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that the plaintiffs had
fully and properly exhausted their administrative relief thus denying the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment and the PLRA proved no obstacle to the plaintiffs’ RLUIPA claim proceeding).
134
Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F. 3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008) (where, for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that summary judgment was improper after finding that the practice of Halal was a
religious exercise that was substantially burdened by prison policies).
135
Gaubatz, supra note 48, at 515.
136
Johnson, supra note 95, at 599-600.
132
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The PLRA has had a consistent and consistently-overlooked
negative impact upon prisoners’ success in religious practice litigation.
The text of RLUIPA promises a better and more accommodating legal
test, but the PLRA has had the effect of stopping many claims before
they could be considered under the RLUIPA test. And no wonder:
“[t]he PLRA,” writes Margo Schlanger, “emboldens prison and jail
officials to make objectionable arguments that must be litigated,
forcing expenditure of resources and prolonging litigation, as well
as further dehumanizing prisoners and promoting a culture of
callousness.”137
Disappointingly, a large number of cases have failed to move
beyond the PLRA screening process or failed at the summary
judgment stage. Consider the Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence on the
topic. As arguably the most diverse and progressive federal circuit,
the Ninth Circuit has seen an abundance of RLUIPA litigation and
generated most of the hallmark opinions on the topic. However, of
the twenty-two prisoner RLUIPA cases that the Ninth Circuit saw
between 2009 and 2010, none of them won ultimate relief. Eleven
were defeated by summary judgment, four were dismissed, and
three were eventually defeated on appeal.138 Only four remaining
cases have a chance of relief, but these are still awaiting final
judgment.139 Also, of the 97 RLUIPA claims considered by the Ninth
Circuit between 2007 and 2008, every single one was dismissed or
denied, extinguishing the prisoner-litigants’ chances of relief from
the judicial system.140
Look, too, within the jurisprudence of the First Circuit Court of
Appeals. From 2009 to 2010, that circuit saw sixteen RLUIPA prisoner
claims; among them, five were defeated by summary judgment, two
were denied relief, two were dismissed. 141 Only one received ultimate
relief, and six still wait in hope that they might see positive results. 142
1. “Legal” Victories Without Policy Changes
True relief—the freedom to practice as a prisoner’s conscience
dictates—requires more than mere appellate court success. Even when a
prisoner’s RLUIPA claim is successful on the merits, the implementation
Margo Schlanger, Preserving the Rule of Law in American’s Jails and Prisons: The Case for Amending
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 139, 145 (2008).
138
Search query used: advanced: RLUIPA & DA (aft 12-31-2008 & bef 01-01-2011) and narrowing
results to the 9th Circuit and prisoner claims.
139
Search query used: advanced: RLUIPA & DA (aft 12-31-2008 & bef 01-01-2011) and narrowing
results to the 9th Circuit and prisoner claims.
140
Search query used: advanced: RLUIPA & DA (aft 12-31-2006 & bef 01-01-2009) and narrowing
results to the 9th Circuit and prisoner claims.
141
Search query used: advanced: RLUIPA & DA (aft 12-31-2008 & bef 01-01-2011) and narrowing
results to the 1st Circuit and prisoner claims.
142
Id.
137
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of new regulations (or inadequacy of new policies intended to address
the problems complained of) has also sparked new RLUIPA claims.
Because RLUIPA does not require every prison within a system to
implement the changes required by one prisoner’s successful lawsuit,
progress has not been uniformly applied. Also, even when the prisoner
has successfully won a RLUIPA claim on the merits, seeing the fruits of
that success can raise issues as well. In Washington v. Klem, for example,
after entering into a settlement agreement, the plaintiff was unable to
enforce it and his motions to the court had no perceptible impact.143
Charles v. Verhagen is another example of a case that won on the merits
but in which the prisoner ultimately got no relief; because the type of
prayer oil allowed by the prison after his successful lawsuit was not the
variety he required, the prisoner initiated follow-on litigation that was
ultimately unsuccessful.144
2. Losses At Summary Judgment On Substantive Issues
Many RLUIPA claims fail because the prison policies are
either deemed not a substantial burden on the prisoners’ religious
practice145 or the policy is justified by a compelling government
interest—typically still prison security and budgetary concerns.146
While a prisoner may argue that his religious practices are being
substantially burdened by a regulation upon personal possessions,
diet and group worship,147 many courts are not sympathetic when
there exists an unrestricted alternative means to a specific religious
practice.148 In many instances, a prison’s implementation of a policy
banning a practice or a prison’s refusal to accommodate an inmate’s
beliefs have been found lawful even under RLUIPA’s test (when, for
example, failure to accommodate a group worship service was found
to be due to a lack of volunteer resources rather than an overt policy
banning the assembly.) 149 Security concerns—however important
and legitimate—may still be used as prison wardens’ legal trump
cards on issues whose impact on security is distant at best. Where, for
example, an inmate has professed a desire to have access to certain
religious objects or materials, some courts have still been reluctant to
388 F. App’x 85, 85-85 (2010) (after entering into a settlement agreement, plaintiff filed a pro se
motion to enforce the agreement and to be appointed council. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court’s denial of the motions because the plaintiff failed to file the supporting documents
expounding his reasons for seeking enforcement of the settlement).
144
348 F.3d 601 (2003).
145
Watkins v. Shabazz, 180 F.App’x 773 (C.A. 9th 2006).
146
Keen v. Noble, 2007 WL 1080849 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
147
Hall v. Ekpe, 2011 WL 2600514 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming the District Court’s summary
judgment in favor of the defendants after the Supreme Court held states do not waive their
sovereign immunity merely because they accepted federal funds).
148
Stavenjord v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 2007 WL 215816, at *5 (D. Ariz. 2007).
149
Smith v. Kyler, 295 F. App’x 479 (3d Cir. 2008).
143
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meet the prisoner’s requests, finding instead that the prison’s need for
security was a compelling interest.150
As foreshadowed earlier, many prisoners’ claims dealing with
religious dietary requirements fail to move beyond the summary
judgment stage because of the existence of alternative diet programs
provided by prisons.151 A number of these cases upheld prisons’
refusals to provide inmates with Halal152 or Kosher food because of the
availability of foods that the prisons and courts deemed satisfactory
substitutes. 153 For example, though a prisoner may prefer a hot Kosher
meal, repetitive (identical) cold Kosher meals were found to satisfy
a prisoner’s religiously-mandated diet.154 Prisoner claims revolving
around religious dietary requirements have also failed to move beyond
the summary judgment stage for other reasons such as a court’s
determination that the prison’s failure to provide a Kosher meal to a
non-Jewish inmate does not violate RLUIPA155 and the court’s deference
to a magistrate judge’s determination that an inmate had not exhausted
his remedies with respect to allegations involving halal meat.156
As was the case under the Turner and O’Lone’s—but now with
the added hurdles of PLRA—when a claim moves beyond the initial
screening stages, prison officials still to seek summary judgment or
defend cases on the merits by simply offering better and better-justified
explanations for policies based on security or budgetary concerns.157

Keen, 2007 WL 10808 (E.D. Cal 2007) (holding that the compelling interest in security of the
prison outweighed the prisoner’s interest in building a “hof”); see also Jones v. Schriro, 2006 WL
2772641 (D. Ariz. 2006) (deciding that even if the prison regulation was a substantial burden
upon the prisoner’s religious practice, the prison’s compelling interest in security outweighed);
Brunskill v. Boyd, 141 F. App’x 771 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the prison’s hair length policy
and limitation on possession of religious articles were the least restrictive means of furthering the
institute’s compelling interests in security, health, and safety of its staff).
151
See supra at Section V. A.
152
Defined as sanctioned by Islamic law; selling or serving food ritually fit according to Islamic
law. Webster’s Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/halal.
153
Watkins v. Shabazz, 180 F. App’x 773 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that the existence of both a
vegetarian diet program and an option to purchase Halal meat at a de minimus cost to the prison
with no cost to the prisoner precluded the prisoner from claiming that his religious practice was
substantially burdened by the prison’s failure to provide Halal meat); see also Sefeldeen v. Alameida,
238 F. App’x 204 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that the district court properly granted summary judgment
because the prison had provided two alternatives to eating Halal meat—a vegetarian equivalent
or the choice of finding a religious organization outside the prison willing to provide Halal meat);
Muhammed v. Sapp, 388 F. App’x 892 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment for the prison
when “alternative” or vegan meals—but not requested meals— were offered to Muslim inmates). Id.
154
Kretchmar v. Beard, 241 F. App’x 863 (3d Cir. 2007).
155
Linehan v. Crosby, 346 F. App’x 471 (11th Cir. 2009) (granting summary judgment for the
prison because failure to provide a Kosher meal to a non-Jewish inmate does not violate RLUIPA.)
156
Jihad v. Fabian, 680 F.Supp.2d 1021 (D. Minn. 2010) (determing that a prisoner must adhere to
the agency’s grievance process to exhaust administrative remedies).
157
See e.g., Rouser v. White, 2010 WL 2541268 (C.A. 9 2010) (the defendants claimed he had not
exhausted all of the administrative remedies and that the plaintiff’s claims were improperly joined).
150
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3. Prisoners’ Losses On Technical PLRA Issues
The exhaustion and screening requirements of the PLRA make it
extremely difficult for a prisoner to file suit, much less prevail upon the
merits of a case.158 Before even reaching the PLRA’s statutorily mandated
screening process, it is not uncommon for a prisoner’s claim to be dismissed
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies—especially given the
judicially-engrafted procedural default rule.159 The PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement provides an affirmative defense where the defendant has the
burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.160 Consider the
“Woodford Rule”—a confusing rule if ever there was one—allowing, as
one commentator explained, “a prisoner’s mistakes in the prison grievance
system to scuttle potential federal constitutional claims.”161 Obviously, a
dismissal on technical grounds frequently precludes federal courts from
ever reaching the merits of cases involving the arguable violation of a
constitutional right that has been—at least outside the prison context—
historically and vigilantly guarded.
In many prisoners’ RLUIPA cases, reviewing courts (both at the trial
and appellate levels) have held that a failure to exhaust administrative
remedies warranted summary judgment in the prisons’ favor.162 In
these cases, prisoner-litigants’ errors left no room for amendment
and re-filing; the PLRA requirements were absolute. A sampling of
California cases reveals that, in the first half of 2010 alone, a significant
number of prisoner complaints were dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.163 Additionally, a non-exhaustive survey of
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement upon RLUIPA claims reveals a
broad swath of dismissals or denials.164 Even in the cases in which the
Kimbrough v. California, 609 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2010) (under the PLRA, prisoner-plaintiffs
could not be awarded attorneys’ fees in RLUIPA claim).
159
See, e.g., Mathis v. Knowles, 81 F. App’x 906 (9th Cir. 2003).
160
Mello v. Martinez, 2010 WL 118394, at * 2 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
161
Shay and Kalb, supra note 99, at 293.
162
See e.g., Lindell v. Casperson, 360 F.Supp.2d 932 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (Wiccan inmate’s claims
failed at summary judgment after he failed to exhaust administrative remedies under PLRA);
Couch v. Jabe, 479 F.Supp.2d 569 (W.D. Va. 2006) (Muslim prisoner’s claim was dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Rogers v. U.S., 696 F.Supp.2d 472 (W.D. Pa. 2010)
(Muslim inmates sued prison officials for selling scented oils used in Muslim services at too high a
cost, but defendants were granted summary judgment because of the Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies).
163
See, e.g., Mello, 2010 WL 118394 (holding that the prisoner failed to state a cognizable claim);
see also, Comundoiwilla v. Evans, No. 1:04-cv-06721-LJO-YNP PC, 2010 WL 669097 (E.D. Cal. Feb.
23, 2010) (ordering plaintiff to file an amended complaint or face dismissal of the non-cognizable
claims); Phillips v. Ayers, No. CV 07-2897-DDP (SH), 2010 WL 1947015 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss prisoner’s RLUIPA claim).
164
See Maddox v. Love, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17680 (dismissal affirmed because of the plaintiff’s
failure to exhaust administrative grievance by naming on his grievance form who was alleged to
have violated his rights); Nifas v. Beard, 374 F. App’x 241 (3d Cir. 2010) (RLUIPA claim dismissed
for failure to exhaust administrative grievance procedure); Seneca v. Arizona, 345 F. App’x 226,
(9th Cir. 2009) (administrative grievance filed was too general and did not exhaust state remedies);
Thomas v. Parker, 318 F. App’x 626 (10th Cir. 2009).
158
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prisoner won ultimate relief, it was hard-fought and delayed through
extended litigation over technical PLRA requirements. Several cases
were unsuccessful in the lower courts because of a purported failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, and only after favorable review in a
circuit court of appeals were then permitted to litigate on the merits. 165
The PLRA’s screening requirement that a prisoner must state a
cognizable claim creates another barrier for pro se litigants seeking
access to the courts.166 In order to avoid dismissal as “frivolous,” the
plaintiff must craft a complaint with “an arguable legal and factual
basis.”167 Similarly, in order to avoid dismissal for failure to state claim,
the plaintiff must craft a complaint that, on one hand, contains more
than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”168 but,
on the other hand, satisfies the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8
pleading requirement of a “short and plain statement showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”169 Specifically, for a claim for relief under
RLUIPA to be cognizable, the “plaintiff must link any RLUIPA claim
together with specific defendants and specific conduct.”170 Crafting an
intelligible complaint that ties critical facts to the relevant theory, and
is simply, concisely and directly stated, is a difficult task for even the
most sophisticated advocate. For a prisoner with limited literacy skills,
education, access to legal research materials, and meager financial
resources, these litigation demands are especially burdensome.171 For
these reasons it is not surprising that prisoners proceeding pro se
would have difficulty stating cognizable claims under RLUIPA.
Further, on the very face of the subsection describing the restriction,
the PLRA’s physical injury or physical harm requirement seems to exempt
See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2009); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197
(2d Cir. 2004); DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2004).
166
Shay and Kalb, supra note 99, at 293.
167
See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (applying to in forma pauperis complaints
the framework used for evaluating legal frivolousness in appeals); cf. Franklin v. Murphy, 745
F.2d 1221,1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984) (adopting a frivolousness standard requiring in forma pauperis
complaints to have “arguable substance in law and fact).
168
See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (holding that although detailed
factual allegations are unnecessary, the complaint must state enough facts to establish the basis
for relief beyond the speculative level).
169
F.R.C.P. 8(a)(2); Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2008) (summary
judgment for the prison affirmed because the remedy sought was held to be barred by the PLRA).
170
See Rider v. Felker, No. CIV S-09-0637 DAD P, 2010 WL 458915, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2010)
(dismissing plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim because it contained only general allegations that defendants
had interfered with his religious exercise).
171
Paula Hannaford-Agor and Nicole Mott, Research of Self-Represented Litigation: Preliminary
Results and Methodological Considerations, 24 The Justice System Journal, Vol. 2 (2003) (“The many
aspects that make up a civil, or even criminal, trial tend to increase the already heavy burden
pro se litigants face when even choosing to file a civil claim. For example, after filing a suit, the
litigant must arrange for service of process, conduct discovery, schedule hearings, file motions,
and eventually present evidence at trial. These are all aspects of a trial that laypeople “rarely have
access or the opportunity to develop.”).
165
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all RLUIPA claims from even remaining in court.172 Though in practice not
all courts have interpreted the PLRA to apply to religious free exercise
claims, it has still proved an impediment in a number of federal circuits. 173
____________________________
These are realities consistently overlooked in literature on the topic
of RLUIPA litigation. Despite its exhaustive discussion of many other
features of the law and its impact, RLUIPA at Four fails to truly address
the implication that the Prison Litigation Reform Act has on prisoners
bringing civil lawsuits through RLUIPA. That Article, for example,
devotes a mere three sentences addressing the fact that the PLRA is
applicable to RLUIPA claims, and merely states that prisoners should
properly pleaded claims within the complaints.174
But it is no wonder that the impact of the PLRA has been littlestudied: only the cases moving beyond the administrative and lower
court stages result in reported opinions. These only scratch the surface
of RLUIPA claims in general; others—especially cases dismissed on
technical grounds—would hardly arouse the interest of anyone who
not looking to lower court case or outcomes. Further, because the PLRA
includes punitive measures for successive petitions (for example, the
loss of “good time” credits), it may inhibit prisoners from ever filing suit
in the first place. Rousing the courage to file a legal claim against one’s
custodian may be sufficiently intimidating to prevent prisoners with
legitimate claims to initiate them in the first place. It is nearly impossible,
therefore, to calculate the number of claims that have been ensnared by
district and lower states courts because of the PLRA or other substantial
issues or that are never even filed because of the daunting nature of the
litigation process. The language of RLUIPA indisputably offers a legal
test more friendly to prisoners’ claims and there has indeed been some
progress from that perspective. Change, if it has come at all, has come
slowly, at great price, and in relatively limited areas of the law.
V. What’s The Problem? What’s The Solution?
A. Comparing Public Rhetoric With Private Intent
(Did Congress Understand PLRA’s Limitation On RLUIPA
Litigation?)
On its face, RLUIPA is the second legislative attempt of a Congress
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see Section IV.A infra.
Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Jennifer D. Larson,
RLUIPA, Distress, and Damages, 74 Chi. L. Rev. 1443, 1458 (2007) (“A prisoner who suffered some
physical harm would be allowed to recover damages for accompanying mental and emotional
distress, but a prisoner who suffered serious violations of his constitutional or statutory rights
without any physical harm would be unable to collect any damages. When the right violated is
RLUIPA’s statutory right of free exercise of religion, such a result is deeply problematic.”).
174
Gaubatz, supra note 48, at 539.
172
173
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seemingly determined to Americans’ free exercise rights—even
those of prisoners.175 The Department of Justice’s Statement on the
Institutionalized Persons Provisions of RLUIPA declared its concern
about Congressional findings that prisoners and others residing in
prisons, jails, or mental institutions are subjected to discriminatory or
arbitrary denial of the ability to practice their faiths. 176
Looking back a few years, however, history tells a slightly more
nuanced story. Although there was widespread support for restoring
the compelling interest test as a way to safeguard the First Amendment
right to free exercise,177 RFRA’s legislative history reveals sharp
divisions among lawmakers when it came to extending heightened
protection to prisoners’ free exercise claims. Vigorous debate
surrounded who was to be included and who was to be excluded from
RFRA. Senator Reid introduced an amendment that would have fully
excluded the prison population from claiming heightened scrutiny for
religious claims under RFRA.178 Growing concern over the increase
in prisoner litigation in the federal court,179 fear that the Act would
strip away the long-recognized deference granted to prison officials
and interfere with prison administration,180 and skepticism about
prisoner’s claims are the primary reasons why the Reid Amendment
received strong support from some many members of Congress.181
As Senator Jesse Helms put it, RFRA’s unamended passage would
mean that “inmates will be provided much greater latitude to assault
legitimate prison authority, by masking disobedience under the guise
of special privileges for religious observation.” 182 While the issue of
its application to prisoners nearly cost RFRA its passage, proponents
See 146 Cong. Rec. S7774, S7775, July 27, 2000, (joint statement of Sens Hatch and Kennedy).
Dept. of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice on the Institutionalized Persons
Provisions of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) (2010)
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/RLUIPA10thAnnivSPLQAs.pdf.
177
139 Cong. Rec. S26408 (1993) (statement of Senator Simpson stating “there is not a single thing
that has come up in this debate that should lead anyone to believe that anything other than that
we all believe in religious freedom for everybody.”).
178
139 Cong. Rec. 26194 (1993) (“Nothwithstanding any other provision of this act, nothing in
this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any
way address that portion of the First Amendment regarding laws prohibiting the free exercise of
religion, with respect to any individual who is incarcerated in a federal, state, or local correctional,
detention, or penal facility (including any correctional, detention, or penal facility that is operated
by a private entity under a contract with a government).”).
179
See 139 Cong. Rec. S26181 (1993) (pointing out that more federal civil cases were brought by
prisoners in 1992 than federal criminal cases were initiated by the government).
180
See 139 Cong. Rec. S26409 (1993) (expressing concern that the “least restrictive meants”
standard for accommodation as determined by the courts could in practice lead to higher costs
and disruptions in security).
181
139 Cong. Rec. S26408 (1993). The legislative history for the floor debates discussing the
proposed amendment are rife with comments made by proponents of the Amendment like
this of Senator Simpson, “This Amendment would exempt prisons and prisoners to avoid the
extraordinary creativity of people who spend their time figuring out how to concoct a new
religion. . . .” Id.
182
139 Cong. Rec. S14515 (1993).
175
176
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of the amendment failed to persuade their colleagues that without the
Reid Amendment, RFRA would “open the floodgates for prisoner’s
religion-based claims.”183
Why, then, of all areas of religious freedom to salvage from the
much-broader (but unconstitutional) RFRA, did Congress focus upon
land use and institutionalized persons? Why does RLUIPA’s legislative
history involve so little controversy (as had existed before RFRA’s
passage) over its application to prisoners? The Congressional record
reveals precious little to answer these questions, but it seems mightily
significant that the PLRA had been passed in the interval.184
The serious and increasing concern over increased prisoner
litigation, after all, had not died with the proposed Reid amendment
to RFRA. A few years later, Senator Oren Hatch spoke as one of the
PLRA’s sponsors and explained, “[Some] prison lawsuits may seem
far-fetched, almost funny, but unfortunately . . . frivolous lawsuits
by prisoners tie up the courts, waste valuable resources, and . . . [the
PLRA] prohibits prisoners from suing for mental or emotional abuse,
absent a prior showing of physical injury.”185
It follows, then, that because of the passage of the PLRA, Congress
seemed far less concerned about RLUIPA’s possible “floodgate of
litigation.” Although at least one critic feared that RLUIPA would
result in “excessive litigation and unacceptable threats to important
penological interests,” that was not the view shared by many voting
members of Congress.186
In addition to the explicit reference in the bill’s text, some supporters
of RLUIPA specifically referred the Prison Litigation Reform Act during
debates: “[t]his provision does not require prison officials to grant
religious requests that would undermine prison discipline, order, and
security. . . . Thus, the courts will continue to be able to reject frivolous
lawsuits with ease.”187 As Congressman Nadler observed, presciently,
“This bill limits the rights of prison inmates to raise otherwise valid
claims under the bill by specifically referencing the Prison Litigation
Reform Act.”188 The existence of the PLRA likely explains the absence
of acrimonious debate about the litigious nature of prisoners and the
dangerous effect RLUIPA would have on prison administration.189
139 Cong. Rec. S26407 (1993).
146 Cong. Rec. S7779 (2000) (statement of Senator Reid voicing his ongoing concern about
extending heightened scrutiny to prisoners’ free exercise claims, “[w]hile I continue to believe that
we should not extend the privilege of a strict scrutiny standard to restrictions on the free exercise
of religion behind the bars of our nation’s prisons, I also recognize certain other realities.”).
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In fact, the PLRA effectively created a “carve-out” for prisoners’
claims, leading to an outcome not unlike what was advocated for and
envisioned under the proposed Reid Amendment to RFRA.190
Some members of Congress foresaw the PLRA’s limitations on
RLUIPA’s application to prisoners as a negative point, but this was
a minority view. Congressman Nadler, for one, said publicly that he
would urge his colleagues to vote against the RLUIPA bill if the PLRA
were specifically referenced or if the PLRA’s application were not in
some way limited to certain claims.191Others, previously critical of
RFRA, threw their support behind RLUIPA. 192
Across the board—from floor debates to the Supreme Court’s
consideration of its constitutionality—RLUIPA was far less controversial
than its predecessor RFRA. However, that the PLRA was specifically
referenced and acknowledged makes it questionable that Congress
ever intended a flood of prisoners’ religious practice claims, much less
a flood of successful ones. Beyond the practical realities of being pro se
litigants, RLUIPA’s protection of prisoners’ religious practice has been
severely hindered by the PLRA requirements. One Congressman noted
that “[t]his bill limits the right of prison inmates to raise otherwise valid
claims under the bill by specifically referencing the Prison Litigation
Reform Act.” 193 This same Congressman warned he would urge his
colleagues to vote against the RLUIPA bill if the PLRA was specifically
referenced, or the PLRA’s application was not in some way limited to
certain claims.194 However, as one scholar convincingly notes, Congress
made no attempt to reconcile the apparent PLRA and RLUIPA conflicts
before RLUIPA’s enactment.195
What then, did Congress actually intend with its passage of RLUIPA?
Did members of Congress fully understand that prisoners’ claims would
be caught in the PLRA’s nets of administrative remedies, potential punitive
measures for “successive” petitions, and other detailed and complicated
limitations on civil rights lawsuits? Whether or not Congress understood
the impact on the ground and in the courts, it clearly intended the PLRA
to apply. Even it had not specifically been referenced in the text of the law
itself and in the floor debates, courts would have presumed Congress to
intend the PLRA’s application to RLUIPA.196
Congress, in considering RLUIPA, clearly responded to (bipartisan)
145 Cong. Rec. H5598 (1999) (statement of Rep. Nadler admitting that the PLRA is a carve-out
for prisoners’ free exercise claims).
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constituencies supporting the bill. Although its primary backing came
from the “usual suspects” of prisoners’ rights groups and ACLU
lobbyists, other smaller groups endorsed it as well.197 One of the
main lobbyist groups supporting RLUIPA was Friends Committee
on National Legislation (FCNL), a Quaker lobbyist group.198 But did
these constituencies fully understand the likely impact the PLRA
would have upon the substance of the prisoners’ claims? Probably not.
Gaubatz’s discussion of RLUIPA describes the statute as a “remarkable
departure” from the legislatures and courts’ previous attempts to
restrict prisoners’ legal rights.199 Still, decisions on the merits are rare,
with actual relief for the prisoner even more so.
Legal impediments—such as the PLRA and the typical absence of
counsel—greatly limit many prisoners’ ability to challenge, through
litigation, prison policies and regulations that curtail their ability to
practice as their consciences dictate. RLUIPA’s alleged intended effect
of helping pro se prisoners bring their free exercise claims—is obviously
diminished by these hurdles. Surviving summary judgment is a cold
comfort and says little about changing policies, programs, or legal
standards. For all the helpful language and bipartisan political rhetoric,
unless a policy challenged or an impediment complained of is actually
removed, RLUIPA has not been nearly as successful as prisoners once
hoped. Whether a case survives a motion for summary judgment is an
interesting academic question. A review of which cases actually grant
the prisoners resolution and relief, however, is the truer test of the law.
And those successes have been hard-fought and rare indeed.
Whether Congressional passage of RLUIPA was a legitimate
effort to more fully accommodate the imprisoned faithful or a safelycynical passage of a popular law never intended to have much of an
impact, RLUIPA has been a disappointment. Ten years later, there have
of course been inroads made and progress pushed, but most of this
development falls short of RLUIPA’s shining promise.

the duty of the court, absent a clearly expressed Congressional intention to the contrary, to regard
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B. Recommendations & Proposed Amendments To PLRA

The strong bipartisan support initially rallied for RLUIPA’s passage
must now be focused towards remedying RLUIPA’s relatively unknown
“PLRA problem.” Courts cannot change how the PLRA restricts RLUIPA,
since the actual text makes PLRA restrictions explicitly applicable. The
political process may be the only real remedy for this problem—but
only once the groups that supported its passage understand what has
happened in the courts since the bill was signed into law.
If Congress truly intended to protect prisoners from institutional
restrictions of their religious liberties, then two primarily remedies
present themselves. Beyond repealing the entire PLRA (which
seems unlikely given the strength of concern over frivolous prison
litigation),200 Congress could specifically exempt RLUIPA claims from
PLRA restrictions or it could amend the PLRA to ensure that more
claims can be fully litigated in court.
Whatever future legislative efforts may entail, any attempts to
soften the impacts of the PLRA generally or specifically in relation
to RLUIPA should address the PLRA’s burden. Each of these is an
impediment on its own, but taken together are daunting and frequently
fatal to even substantial RLUIPA litigation. Some of the hurdles that
prisons must jump through include filing fees and screening processes
and the physical injury requirement that PLRA places on them. These
recommendations include a number of amendments.
Because a full repeal of the PLRA is improbable, the next best
solution is to restructure the PLRA to be more fair to prisoner litigants.
Though the Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007 died in committee, its
text and supporters offered thoughtful suggestions from bipartisan
supporters. This Article’s review of the PLRA’s impact upon RLUIPA
litigation concludes that changes in the following areas would allow
more prisoners’ religious claims to reach decisions on their merits.
1. Prior (Unsuccessful) Efforts To Amend The PLRA
Strange partners—as with the original passage of RLUIPA—have
worked at various points toward changes or amendments to the PLRA,
which is widely acknowledged to have prevented substantial change
otherwise possible under RLUIPA. Although never passed, the Prison
Abuse Remedies Act of 2007, which was introduced in the House
Judiciary Committee, offered a good deal of hope about how RLUIPA
may have eventually become more effective.201
Courts considering prisoners’ civil suits have legal tests at their disposal that are more than
sufficient to address issues of successive or abusive litigation. If the entire Act were be repealed
(even if it was later re-written), legitimate prisoner claims could be heard on the merits—without
excessive delays and costs. This remedy, however, is admittedly unlikely.
201
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“There are two kinds of walls in American prisons,” wrote ACLU
Legislative Counsel Jesselyn McCurdy, “one that keeps prisoners from
escaping, and another that keeps the abuse that happens inside from
ever reaching the light of day. The Prison Litigation Reform Act creates
prisons within prisons, except with paperwork instead of locks and
administrative hurdles instead of bars.”202 The proposed amendment,
among other things, would have exempted juveniles from PLRA’s
restrictions, removed the “physical injury” requirement (particularly
from free exercise and other constitutional violation claims), and
softened exhaustion requirements for all prisoners’ civil lawsuits. The
bill failed to progress out of the committee, but its diverse support may
lead to the passage of a similar bill in a future legislative session.
That particular proposed bill garnered support from Jeanne
Woodford, the former Warden of San Quentin State Prison; Stephen
Bright, the President of the Southern Center for Human Rights; various
Attorney Generals; and religious leaders from a variety of faith groups.
Woodford, perhaps surprisingly, strongly supported and still supports
the reform as one frustrated by the PLRA’s harsh restrictions: “For those
prison officials who fear the courts, the PLRA provides an incentive to
make their grievance procedures more complicated than necessary. As
a result, prisoners and prison officials are more likely to get tied up in a
game of ‘gotcha’ rather than spending that time resolving a prisoner’s
complaint.”203
And in addition to the “usual suspects” of civil rights and criminal
defense litigators, conservative religious leaders also support more
generous amendments to the PLRA. As one religious leader testified,
“Few prisoners file grievance for the simple reason that they know it is
useless to do so and, just as importantly, because they know they are
likely to face retaliatory punishment if they do.”204 That understanding
of the realities faced by prisoners mirrors their own concerns and
frustrations and helps explain why RLUIPA has not been a more
effective tool in free exercise litigation.
Congress should reevaluate the failed Prisoner Abuse Remedies
Act—or craft a document similar to that bill — and include the initial
proposals in the PLRA to ensure that the RLUIPA becomes more
effective. Without such action, the rhetoric in support of free exercise,
the floor comments, the public statements—ring hollow.
See Jesselyn McCurdy, Prison Litigation Reform Act Must be Fixed, Law denies justice to victims
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2. Physical Injury Requirement

The PLRA’s physical injury requirement continues to confound
courts, though some federal courts have declined to apply it to religious
practice claims. Repealing this subsection—particularly as it relates to
RLUIPA issues—makes good sense and allows claims of this sort a
greater chance of a hearing on the merits. After all “[PLRA]’s purpose to
insulate from review all claims in which legitimate constitutional issues
predominate without accompanying physical harm.” 205 “Plainly,”
the court continues, constitutional claims are “qualitatively different
from lawsuits seeking damages for ‘insufficient storage locker space,
a defective haircut by a prison barber, the failure of prison officials
to invite a prisoner to a pizza party for a departing prison employee,
and yes, being served chunky peanut butter instead of the creamy
variety.’”206
Congress should repeal the requirement that prisoners suffer a
physical injury in order to recover for mental or emotional injuries
caused by the failure of a prison to accommodate religious practice
needs.207 First, as many federal courts interpreting this requirement
have explained, the subsection of this statute makes little sense in light
of the emotional or spiritual nature of RLUIPA claims.208 Repealing the
physical injury requirement would have made a difference in multiple
cases and at different stages in those cases, and because of the confusion
caused by its text, lower federal courts are applying independent logic
to cases’ individual facts.
For example, in Mayfield v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice,209 the
defendant who won his claim was not able to receive compensatory
damages due to the PLRA’s physical injury requirement.210
3. Exhaustion Requirement
Amending or repealing the PLRA exhaustion requirement could be
the most important area requiring Congressional action to enhance the
likelihood that prisoners may be heard. Requiring that a prisoner who
has not exhausted administrative remedies at the time a lawsuit is filed
be permitted to pursue the claim through an administrative- remedy
process still serves the ultimate purpose of the PLRA—allowing
problems to be fixed at the local level—without deferring entirely to
prison officials with an interest in the outcome of RLUIPA litigation.
This requirement, of course, can prevent prisoners from even having
205
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207
208
209
210
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their claims heard—as described supra in Section V. B. 3—or entangle
prisoner-litigants in extended litigation about technical matters rather
than the merits of their religious practice claims. 211
4. Filing Fee Provisions
Congress should modify or repeal the filing fee provisions that
apply only to prisoners.212 Prisoners are some of the poorest citizens
of our society, and it stands to reason that a prisoner cannot expect
to prevail upon a claim if he cannot first afford to file it in court.
Under the PLRA, before filing a lawsuit, even prisoners must first
pay a filing fee.213 Those who cannot pay the initial filing fee may still
file214 but will usually be required to make payments on the balance
of the filing fee on a monthly basis thereafter.215 Though the impact of
this upon RLUIPA claims is difficult to measure (since by definition,
court opinions only describe the outcomes of cases filed), filing fee
provisions serve as yet another impediment to prisoners’ free exercise
lawsuits and undermines Congress’s stated support of religious
practice among prisoners.
5. PLRA Screening Requirements
Even if a prisoner has succeeded in satisfying the stringent
administrative exhaustion requirement by patiently and timely
navigating the prison administrative grievance process, he must still
comply with the PLRA’s screening requirements. It requires federal
courts to conduct a preliminary screening of all prisoner complaints
against prison officials and dismiss—sua sponte—any action or claim
that in the court’s view is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
6. The Three-Strike Rule
Furthermore, under the PLRA’s “three-strike” rule, prisoners are
essentially afforded only three chances to get it right.216 A dismissal
of the prisoner’s claim for any of the aforementioned reasons counts
as a strike. Prisoners who have had civil actions or appeals dismissed
three times before because they were either frivolous or malicious, or
Rogers v. U.S., 696 F.Supp.2d 472 (where the petitioner was prevented from filing his RLUIPA
lawsuit because he had not exhausted the grievance procedure in the prison where he was
incarcerated).
212
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failed to state a claim, will not be allowed to file in forma pauperis unless the
prisoner can prove an “imminent” threat of “serious physical injury.”217
As described above in Section V.B.3., this provision in particular
communicates a message of power and danger, even in relation
to prisoners’ lawsuits about religious matters. Despite obvious
Congressional concern over frivolous lawsuits, penalties such as the
ones described in the PLRA are inappropriate if its goal was ever to
help ensure that prisoners are protected from improper restrictions
upon their religious practice.
7. The PLRA And Attorneys’ Fees
Finally, Congress should either repeal or amend the PLRA to allow
prisoners who prevail on civil rights claims to recover attorney’s fees
on the same basis as the general public in civil rights cases.218 Another
factor related to prisoners’ success on these issues relates to their ability
to retain counsel or locate an organization willing to bring a case on
their behalf.
Recovery of attorney’s fees is necessary to fund the legal
organizations—frequently not-for-profit—who accept RLUIPA cases. It
is these organizations which are penalized by the Act’s restrictions, and
this doubtless serves as an additional roadblock to litigation through
limitation of available legal resources. If a lawsuit is meritorious,
why should a prisoner’s attorney not be awarded fees just as any
other meritorious litigant would be under the circumstances? Finally,
under the PLRA, federal courts may revoke “good time credits” from
prisoners who have filed “frivolous lawsuits.” This provision alone
deters many prisoners from filing lawsuits challenging their free
exercise accommodation.
Any of the requirements of this process, when coupled with the
three strikes rule, may forever close the courthouse doors to aggrieved
and deserving plaintiffs.
____________________________
Although prior legislative attempts to amend the PLRA have failed,
perhaps the missing piece was full education and information about
the failure of RLUIPA claims because of technical requirements and
hurdles. Although members of varied communities have supported the
simplification of prisoners’ civil claims, the legislative history of the Prison
Abuse Remedies Act fails to fully discuss the PLRA’s impact upon religious
free exercise. Including the communities initially supportive of RLUIPA—
and of free exercise generally—may be the key to ensuring that RLUIPA can
finally have the impact that at least some supporters hoped it would.
Id.
Though unsuccessful, the Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007, HR 4109 §7, also proposed
restoring attorney fees for PLRA claims.
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Concluding Thoughts: On Their Own (Again)
With the benefit of ten years of hindsight, it would be foolish to
claim that RLUIPA has had no impact prisoners of faith. It clearly has;
prisoner free exercise claims have never enjoyed particular success –
under any reviewing test—but some claims are indeed winning. On
the other hand, the cases that actually do see relief are fewer than many
expected, and it is not particularly clear that the cases winning relief
could not have prevailed under the Turner/ O’Lone tests.
There may be a number of factors that contribute to this relatively
disappointing impact of a law that garnered such support and
galvanized such hope.219 It not only gathered bipartisan excitement at
the time of its passage and signing—it was actually drafted by those
who usually find themselves on opposing sides of such issues.220
However, assuming that Congress intended RLUIPA to
revolutionize legal examination of prisoner free exercise claims, it has
fallen short of the mark. In order for the legal test of RLUIPA to have
the broad impact its text implies, Congress must make fundamental
changes to (or abandon entirely) the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
Nearly a decade after RLUIPA’s passage, American’s imprisoned men
and women still face significant related to fundamental requirements
of their faith, and there is little to give hope that the litigation process
will ever become less complicated, less expensive, or ultimately more
successful. On legal questions so fact-driven, a claim that faces so many
procedural hurdles will never be an easy one to win. The difficulty is of
course compounded by the fact that most of the claims are brought pro
se and by litigants with limited access to investigation or legal research
tools. With a federal law threatening loss of “good time” credit and
other retribution for filing a religious free exercise claim that others
might view as “frivolous,” the law hardly encourages the imprisoned
faithful to boldly claim a right to practice as their consciences dictate.
Who among us would take such risks in order merely to get to court to
litigate a religious practice issue?
When the courts show few signs of drastically re-interpreting
PLRA, then any changes are dependent upon a political process.
Either members of Congress who supported RLUIPA initially should
reexamine the application of PLRA to those legal claims (or the PLRA
Rare indeed are the issues on which the American Civil Liberties Union, The Christian Legal
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religious and civil liberties groups, including the American Civil Liberties Association, Christian
Coalition, Family Research Council, and People for the American Way. These are organizations that
almost always find themselves on opposite sides in religious disputes.” B.A Robinson, Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts Additional Attempts at Federal Legislation: RLPRA and RLUIPA, http://www.
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itself), or the constituents who urged RLUIPA’s passage should
explain concern to their lawmakers. The problem, though, is that so
few perceive the discord in Congress (at least publicly) showing full
support for religious practice in prison while fully supporting a law
that makes it so difficult to challenge restrictions of that free exercise.
First steps, though, are discussion and education around this issue.
The warden and the prisoners’ rights advocate must continue to explain
the actual consequences—unintended or otherwise—of the PLRA. The
litigants themselves must carry on as they have been, facing the hurdles
of administrative remedies, filing fees, and potential retribution for the
lawsuits they file. And those others who can recognize the benefits of
religious practice in prison and the solace it can afford must continue
to explore creative alternatives to singing RLUIPA’s praises while the
law falls far short of its promises.

